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This study investigates the interest rate pass-through in the four Common Monetary Area 
(CMA) countries of the South African Customs Union (SACU) during the period from 1991 
to 2005. We employ a unifying empirical pass-through model that allows for thresholds, 
asymmetric adjustment, and structural changes over time. Our results show that the bank 
lending markets of the CMA exhibit quite some degree of homogenization as the pass-through 
is often fast and complete. Deposit markets are somewhat more heterogeneous by showing 
differing degrees of interest rate stickiness and asymmetric adjustment in some countries. 
Policy makers should therefore be concerned about imperfect competition which may be at 
the heart of the remaining cross-country differences in monetary transmission in the CMA. 
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1. Introduction 
Among the five members of the Southern African Custom Union (SACU), South 
Africa, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland form a Common Monetary Area (CMA) and only 
the fifth SACU member, Botswana, remains outside the CMA. In the presence of free capital 
movements, members of a currency union forego individual monetary autonomy. In contrast 
to the recently formed European Monetary Union however, the four CMA countries do not 
have a supranational central bank conducting the monetary policy. Rather, the four countries 
conduct a quasi currency board arrangement with the South African Rand as the anchor 
currency. This leads to a number of important research questions with respect to the workings 
of monetary policy in these countries. First, how does the monetary transmission process 
work in these four countries? Second, how does national monetary policy and its effects 
depend on the anchor country’s monetary policy? Third, how similar are the responses to 
monetary policy impulses across the member countries? One avenue to investigate these 
issues is the use of vector auto regression (VAR) models of monetary policy. A different 
strategy is to separate the monetary transmission process analytically into a financial and a 
real part. Especially for countries like the CMA members where bank lending is the most 
important form of financial intermediation and which have been undergoing important and 
deep financial reforms, it makes sense to concentrate more deeply on the financial part of the 
transmission process with a particular emphasis on the role of structural change. Our paper 
will address the three issues mentioned above with respect to changing financial market 
structures in the CMA. 
A widely used methodology to investigate the financial part of the monetary 
transmission process is interest rate pass-through (PT) estimation which can reveal how fast 
and how complete changes in monetary policy rates are passed onto bank lending and deposit 
rates. However, the speed and the size (completeness) of the PT depend on the banking 
market structure and potential information asymmetries. Thus, PT studies can also reveal 
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information about competition in banking markets. In an international context, PT studies can 
furthermore reveal asymmetries across countries under a single monetary policy (Sander and 
Kleimeier, 2004). This methodology has extensively been applied to the euro zone and seen a 
number of recent refinements more recently. PT studies are based on a variant of the 
pioneering work by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994). Important contributions include BIS 
(1994), Cottarelli, Ferri and Generale (1995), Borio and Fritz (1995), Mojon (2000), de Bondt 
et al. (2002), Sander and Kleimeier (2002), Toolsema, Sturm and de Haan (2002), Heinemann 
and Schüler (2003), de Bondt (2004), and De Graeve et al. (2004). Typically these studies 
find a substantial degree of short-run bank interest rate stickiness, partly even a long-run lack 
of a full PT which may point to the existence of credit rationing phenomena (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981) and considerable differences in the PT across the countries of the euro zone. 
Furthermore, asymmetric adjustment of bank interest rates depending on the type of interest 
rate shock is regularly documented. Despite these commonalties, the existing studies often use 
differing approaches and consequently lead to diverging results. Sander and Kleimeier (2004) 
therefore introduce a unifying methodological framework for analyzing the PT process in the 
euro zone. Looking to the CMA countries the lack of PT studies is striking. A notable 
exemption is Aziakpono (2005) who focuses however on the use of PT results as a measure of 
financial integration. By investigating how central bank and bank interest rates depend on 
each other across CMA countries, he interprets his empirical findings as a support the South 
African Dominance (SAD) hypothesis, i.e. South African interest rates are influencing the 
other countries’ policy and bank interest rates. However, he attributes this convergence not so 
much a result of market convergence, i.e. arbitrage in financial markets, but to policy 
convergence, i.e. the central banks adhere to the quasi currency board arrangements and 
adjust the policy rates to the South African rates. 
Our study directly investigates the PT in all four CMA countries. Taking into account 
Aziakpono’s SAD hypothesis we will investigate both, how national bank rates react to 
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national monetary policy rate changes and how they react to South African monetary policy 
rate changes. In doing so, we use discount rates as well as T-bill rates as proxies for the 
monetary policy stance. Given the changing financial structures over time we first conduct 
structural break tests which search for an unknown, endogenously determined break point. 
After identifying break-free (sub-)periods we estimate the PT by means of an automatically 
selected PT model out of a large variety of symmetric, asymmetric, and threshold models. The 
results shed light on three issues: (1) the workings and changes of the financial part of the 
monetary transmission process in all four CMA countries, (2) the effectiveness and 
competition in the national banking markets, and (3) the role and importance of a potentially 
differential impact of the South African monetary policy on bank interest rates in the other 
CMA countries. The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides the methodology and 
data description. In section 3 we discuss the results of our analyses and section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
Our study focuses on four CMA countries South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia, and 
Swaziland. For these countries we collect monthly data from January 1991 to May 2005 for 
two bank interest rates and two proxies of the monetary policy rate: Prime lending rates, 
deposit rates, Treasury bill rates, and discount rates. The data are obtained from Datastream 
who in turn collects these series from the lines 60p, 60l, 60c, and 60 of the IFS, respectively. 
The Namibian Treasury bill and discount rate series are incomplete and have been completed 
with data directly obtained from the Namibian central bank. The development of these rates 
over time is presented in Figures 1. 
 
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
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Following Sander and Kleimeier (2004)1, we model the PT based on a unifying 
empirical approach that also allows for long-run cointegration relationships as well as 




































where BRt and Mt are national bank and monetary policy proxy rates, respectively, and k* and 
n* indicate the optimal lag lengths.2  Equation (1) describes the PT model as a standard model 
in levels (STD_LL) and is chosen for interest rates that exhibit an I(0) property. However, 
since interest rates are often found to be I(1), the empirical PT model is best estimated using 
first differences as stated in equation (2). This standard specification (STD) avoids spurious 
regression problems but leads to a loss of information about long-run relationships. If BR and 
M are cointegrated, this information can fortunately be recovered. Equation (2) then needs to 
be augmented by a lagged error correction term (ECTt-1) as shown in equation (3). By 
estimating the long-run cointegration relationship (4) the ECT can be obtained as shown in 
equation (5)3: 
tt0t uθMθBR ++=  (4) 
ECTt-1 = ut-1 (5) 
Given that financial markets in CMA countries have been undergoing structural 
changes we will first test for structural breaks in the relationship between the monetary policy 
                                                 
1 This methodology section is largely based on Sander and Kleimeier (2004). 
2 Whenever an optimal lag length has to be determined, the minimum AIC criterion is used allowing for a 
maximum of four lags. 
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rate proxy and the national bank rate. We determine the presence and timing of the break 
endogenously by estimating a supremum F (supF) test for equation (4).4 This test can be 
interpreted as a rolling test since standard Chow tests are conducted for a series of different 
break points, which move through the mid-80% of the sample period.5 On the basis of these 
tests we construct – when appropriate – pre- and post-break periods for every national bank 
interest rate. This allows us to obtain additional information on the timing of structural 
changes and to estimate PT models for break-free sample periods.  
In estimating the PT we allow for different types of adjustment pattern. If the ECT is 
defined as in equation (5), a symmetric adjustment model (SYM) is estimated, where the 
adjustment mechanism is independent of the state of the dis-equilibrium. However, the PT 
process is often characterized by threshold and asymmetric adjustment mechanisms. Next to 
the symmetric error-correction process we therefore consider several asymmetric 
specifications for the adjustment of interest rates. These state-dependent models all belong to 
the group of threshold autoregressive (TAR) models and differ with respect to the definition 
of the ECT. 
A first state-dependent adjustment mechanism allows for differing adjustment speed 
above or below a given threshold. In the simplest case of the TAR0 model6 this threshold is 
set to zero, typically implying different adjustment speed to rising versus falling monetary 
policy rates. Thus, the ECT becomes: 
ECTt-1 = It ut-1 + (1- It) ut-1       with It = 1 if ut-1 ≥ a0* and 0 otherwise (6) 
where It represents a Heaviside indicator for different states of ut-1 and a0* = 0. The second 
asymmetric model (TAR*) is a modification of the TAR0 such that the threshold a0* is now 
                                                                                                                                                        
3 Cointegration testing is based on the Durbin-Watson (DW), Dickey-Fuller (DF) and augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) tests.  
4 Strictly speaking equation (4) can only be interpreted as a long-run cointegration relationship when all interest 
rates are I(1). This condition is, however, fulfilled for all interest rates under investigation here. 
5 For details on this test see Andrews (1993), Diebold and Chen (1996), and Hansen (1992). SupF equals the 
largest Chow F-statistic and is compared to critical values as reported by Hansen (1992). 
6 See Tong (1983). 
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allowed to deviate from zero. The rationale is that bank rates may adjust differently to a dis-
equilibrium once a certain minimum deviation in one direction is exceeded. The third 
variation is a Band-TAR model (B-TAR*), which can reflect both interest rate smoothing as 





























Finally, our fourth and fifth asymmetric models represent momentum threshold autoregressive  
models (M-TAR0, M-TAR*) where the adjustment depends on the speed of deviation from 
equilibrium. Therefore, M-TAR adjustment can reflect behavior of banks, which attempt to 
smooth out large market rate changes. In these models, the ECT depends on the change in the 
error correction term ∆ut-1 such that 
ECTt-1 = It ρ1 ∆ut-1 + (1-It) ρ2 ∆ut-1  with It = 1 if ∆ut-1 ≥ a0* and 0 otherwise (8) 
with a0=0 for the MTAR0 model and a0=a0* for the MTAR* model.7 
In order to find the empirical PT model that optimally fits the data we follow an 
(almost) automatic model selection procedure: We first investigate the unit root characteristics 
of each interest rate. By applying unit root tests which are well specified even in the presence 
of a structural break, we can simply focus on the full sample period here. Next, we test for 
structural breaks in the long-run relationship in order to define break-free (sub-)periods. For 
the full sample period as well as for all sub-periods we conduct the following model selection 
process: In case of I(0) for both BR and M we choose the STD_LL model as the optimal PT 
model. Otherwise, we proceed with cointegration testing. We first estimate all TAR-type 
models and select that TAR-type model which best fits the data based on the AIC criterion. 
For this model, we conduct cointegration and asymmetry tests. If asymmetric cointegration is 
                                                 
7 For cointegration testing in TAR-type models see Enders and Siklos (2000). Regarding the determination of the 
optimal threshold a0* see Chan (1993). With respect to the calculations of multipliers see Sander and Kleimeier 
(2004). 
 8
confirmed, the PT model is set as the best TAR-type model. If asymmetric cointegration is not 
confirmed, we continue with symmetric cointegration testing. If symmetric cointegration is 
found, the PT model is set as SYM. If symmetric cointegration is rejected, we select the 
standard model (STD). Based on the selected PT models, we obtain multipliers of different 
time horizons (impact, 1, 3, 6, 12 months, and long run) and different interest rate shocks (-
1%, -0.5%, +0.5%, +1%).  
 
3. Evidence on Pass-Through Changes in CMA Countries 
3.1. The Changing Long-Run Relation between Monetary Policy and Bank Interest Rates 
We start our investigation by testing if the interest rates in our sample are integrated of 
order 1. Our unit root tests confirm the requested property.8 Thus, the long-run relationship 
between the driving monetary policy rates such as the national and South African (SA) 
discount and T-bill rates and the national bank rates based on equation (4) can be visualized 
as a possible cointegrating relationship. Next we test for endogenous structural breaks in this 
long-run relationship. The critical values depend on the model and the number of observation, 
but as a rule of thumb one can say that a value above 15 for the supF-test indicates a structural 
break. Figure 2 illustrates the results of our supF-tests and clearly indicates the pattern of 
structural change in the CMA banking markets.9 
 
(Insert Figure 2 about here) 
 
Starting with South Africa, we find a stable relationship between discount rates and 
lending rates, but clear evidence for a break in the relation to the deposit rate in May 1997. 
When the T-bill rate is considered as the driving rate (see Panel C of Figure 1) the estimated 
                                                 
8 For details see Table A1 in the Appendix. 
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break point for deposit rates is slightly later in September 1998. Moreover, the long-run 
relation between T-bill and lending rates also shows a break in May 1997. All rates are 
cointegrated in all sub-periods. Deposit rates show a more than full PT with respect to 
discount rates before the break and a slightly less than full PT after the break. Also with 
respect to T-bill rates the size of the PT has slightly been reduced but is now remarkably close 
to one. This could indicate that T-bills are almost perfect substitutes for deposits – at least in 
the long run. Thus this result can provide a benchmark for the other CMA countries. With 
respect to lending we also find full PT in response to the discount rate. However, with respect 
to the T-bill rate there was no full PT before the break. This situation has changed to the effect 
that we now find more than full PT. In sum, it appears that today we find a full long-run PT in 
South Africa for both loans and deposits with the national T-bill rate playing an increasingly 
important role as the driving interest rate. 
Moving to Lesotho we find strong evidence for structural breaks in the deposit market 
in the late 1990, regardless which driving rate is considered. With respect to lending, 
structural changes are increasingly becoming visible in the recent years only. We also use 
South African rates as driving rates and obtain an interesting result: Deposit rates have similar 
break points regardless whether national or South African driving rates are being considered. 
The break points for lending rates reaction to South African driving rates are also found to be 
around the late 1990s and are therefore preceding the break points with respect to national 
policy rates – which occur in 2003 only – by some five years. Lending rates in Lesotho show 
in the post-break period a full PT with respect to the national discount rate and the SA T-bill 
rate. This could suggest that SA T-bill impact on national lending rate via their impact on 
national discount rates. The size of the PT for deposit rates has generally become somewhat 
smaller over time. This is especially true with respect to national discount rate where the long-
                                                                                                                                                        
9 The exactly determined structural breaks can be obtained from Table A2 in the Appendix. The sample period is 
then split into a pre- and post-break period and cointegration testing proceeds with results reported in Table A3 
in the Appendix. 
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term PT is down to 0.26. Here it appears that the impact of the South African discount rate 
with a PT size of 0.54 is somewhat higher. However, like in South Africa the T-bill rate 
shows a higher PT with coefficients of 0.66 (national T-bill) and 0.61 (SA T-Bill), 
respectively. Unlike in South Africa there is no full PT for deposit rates, indicating a 
relatively less competitive deposit market in Lesotho. 
Swaziland’s deposit markets show structural breaks as early as September 1994 
(national discount rate), September 1992 (SA discount rate) and October 1992 (SA T-bill 
rate). Before these early break points, the PT was rather low, which eventually could have 
been caused by the small sample size. After these break points, the size of the PT has become 
remarkably high (0.86 national discount rate, 0.75 SA discount rate, 0.84 SA T-bill rate) 
though it is still falling behind the PT-efficiency of South Africa. With respect to the national 
T-bill rate we find a rather late break in April 2003. This break indicates that the efficiency of 
the PT in Swaziland has improved from 0.78 and 0.88, thus confirming the increasing 
importance of this rate for the pricing of deposits. With respect to Swaziland’s lending rates 
our results are influenced completely by the fact that the lending rates are fully tied to the 
national discount rate. Thus we obtain a break point in August 2003 when the spread was 
allowed to increase from 3% to 3.5%. Consequently, the results for the other driving rates are 
not influenced by credit market conditions but by the relationship between them and the 
national discount rate. Given the less-than one-to-one relationship amongst them the PT size 
is typically less than one, except for the period from September 2001 when the Swaziland’s 
discount rate has been tied one-to-one to the South African discount rate. 
Namibia’s deposit markets are most distinct from those of the other CMA countries. 
With respect to the national discount rate the estimated break point is in October 1995. After 
this break the policy rate is not cointegrated anymore with the deposit rates and the PT after 
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the break is only 0.38.10 All other driving rates show break points in late 1999 to early 2000. 
The South African discount rate is now of no relevance to the deposit rate-PT in Namibia.11 In 
fact, it is the T-bill rate that influences deposit rates in Namibia. With long-run PT 
coefficients of 0.58 (national T-bill) and 0.49 (SA T-bill), the PT size is however the lowest 
among CMA deposit markets. Moreover, our estimates show that these numbers have 
somewhat decreased in the post-break period. Namibian lending markets show early 
breakpoints around 1994 for all driving rates except the national discount rate where no break 
was found. Concentrating thus on the current period, we find an almost full PT with respect to 
national and South-African T-bill rates, while there is a somewhat smaller “discount-rate 
addiction” as revealed by a long-run PT multiplier of 0.85 (national discount rate) and 0.89 
(SA discount rate). However, looking again at Figure 1 shows that a second peak is building 
up in the early 2000s indicating the potential presence of a new structural break between the 
Namibian lending rate and the T-bill rates which can be investigated further in future studies. 
In sum, we find a quite strong PT in CMA banking markets not only for loans but also 
for deposits. Compared to results documented for the European Monetary Union (see e.g. 
Sander and Kleimeier, 2004) the PT in CMA countries is thus comparatively more efficient, 
for both loans and deposits. Country differences are found, but are not dramatic, especially 
with respect to loans. The largest difference are found in the long-run PT for deposits with 
South Africa showing a full PT while Namibia exhibits  the lowest PT size. Generally it is 
found that the T-bill rates are playing an increasingly more important role compared to 
classical policy rates, such as the discount rate. Moreover, given the efficiency of the PT, the 
monetary policy of South Africa has a direct influence on the bank rates in all CMA countries. 
This impact is increasingly mediated through T-bill markets and – at times – monetary 
                                                 
10 Note that in this case we cannot use the slope coefficient of the cointegration regression reported in Table A3 
in the appendix as an estimator for the long-run multiplier. Instead, the long-run multiplier is obtained from the 
STD-model estimate provided in Table A5 in the Appendix. 
11 Again we do not find cointegration. The long-run multiplier obtained from the STD model is only 0.08. 
 12
conditions in South Africa show an even stronger influence on national bank rates than 
national conditions as measured by national driving interest rates. 
 
3.2. Short-Run Dynamics and Asymmetries in Bank Rate Adjustments 
Next to the long-run, we also estimate optimal short-run and possibly asymmetric PT 
models for all rates, countries and sub-periods and thereby obtain measures for the speed of 
the PT.12 In very few cases, notably for Lesotho’s relationship between lending rate and 
national discount rate and Swaziland’s relationship between the deposit rate and the national 
T-bill rate, our methodology selects asymmetric models which yield implausible results due to 
the very short estimation period in the post-break period. In these cases we also supply results 
for the less data-demanding symmetric model. In Table 1 we have compiled an overview of 
the results by concentrating on current multipliers for the post-break period. 
 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
 
Starting with deposits we can confirm the well-document phenomenon of short-run 
stickiness of deposit rates. However, South Africa and Swaziland have the least sticky deposit 
rates while the impact multiplier in Lesotho and even more so in Namibia are very small. 
However, typically three months after a monetary policy shock deposit rate are moving 
already closer to the long-run equilibrium. Regarding asymmetries we find that deposit rates 
adjust somewhat faster downward than upward – a typical sign of imperfect competition. For 
illustrative purposes we have also calculated unweighted averages of the obtained multipliers. 
They confirm that not only in the long but also in the short run T-bill rates play a 
quantitatively more important role in influencing deposit rates. And given the impact of South 
African T-bill rates on other CMA countries’ financial markets it can be shown that this rate 
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could even have a more important effect on national deposit market than national discount 
rates, but only when they are moving upward. 
In lending markets also some stickiness is found as measured by the impact 
multipliers. Interestingly, on average South African T-bill rates seem to be of most important 
in the very short run. An explanation could be that policy maker in the other CMA countries 
react with their policy rates to movements in the South African T-bill market as suggested by 
Aziakpono (2005), and - if this is anticipated by market participants - lending rates may adjust 
immediately. This argument can be supported by the results for the interim multipliers which 
show a certain “discount rate addiction”. This is partly due to loan rate indexing in Swaziland 
and some “overshooting” in Lesotho. But also in other countries the reaction to discount rate 
changes sets in rather soon, so that long-run multipliers are almost fully approached after 
three or six months. We also find only few asymmetries which are rather specific for one or 
two countries in their reaction to certain driving rates only. It is thus remarkable that the PT 
reacts to and depends on the South African rates not only in size but also in speed. 
 In sum, we find a quiet homogeneous PT process for lending rates and a less 
homogeneous one for deposit rates in the CMA countries. South African T-bill rates play an 
important role to influence national discount rates, national T-bill rates and finally bank 
interest rates. In this respect our study confirms the finding of Aziakpono (2005) who has 
attributed his empirical support for the South African Dominance hypothesis to policy 
convergence, i.e. that central banks adjust the policy rates to the South African rates. The PT 
is rather fast by international standards even for deposits which nevertheless indicate the 
presence of market imperfection by showing signs of short- and long-run stickiness as well as 
some asymmetric adjustment pattern, such as a faster downward adjustment of deposit rates. 
                                                                                                                                                        
12 The detailed statistics for the model selection can be found in table A4 in the Appendix. The resulting 
multipliers can be found in Table A5 in the Appendix. 
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4. Conclusions 
The banking markets of the CMA exhibit quite some degree of integration with an 
important role of the South African T-bill rates in driving national policy, market and bank 
interest rates. With respect to lending markets the interest PT across all four countries is rather 
but not perfectly homogenous. We often find a full PT in the long-run with a relatively fast 
adjustment over some six month to the major driving interest rates. These adjustments take 
place with only few asymmetries. With respect to deposit markets the PT is more 
heterogeneous across countries with South Africa on the one hand exhibiting a full and fast 
PT and Namibia on the other hand exhibiting more deposit rate stickiness and adjustment 
asymmetries thus pointing to some degree of market imperfection. Policy makers therefore 
should not only be concerned with integration policies but also competition policies which 
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(Insert Tables A1 toA5 here) 
 
Table 1: Selected Current Multipliers Based on Optimal Pass-Through Model
impact 3 mth 3 mth 6 mth 6 mth 
country driving rate start end model multiplier upward downward upward downward long-run
Panel A: Deposit Rate
South Africa national discount 1997.06 2005.05 MTAR* 0.50 1.11 1.22 0.84 0.85 0.91
national T-bill 1998.09 2005.05 MTAR* 0.71 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.01
Lesotho national discount 1999.03 2005.05 MTAR* 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.18 0.18 0.26
SA discount 1998.04 2005.05 MTAR* 0.26 0.37 0.37 0.53 0.53 0.54
national T-bill 1998.07 2005.05 MTAR* 0.13 0.31 0.45 0.49 0.61 0.66
SA T-bill 1998.06 2005.05 MTAR* 0.56 0.45 0.45 0.56 0.56 0.61
Swaziland national discount 1994.10 2005.05 MTAR* 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.86
SA discount 1992.10 2005.05 MTAR0 0.37 0.66 0.65 0.77 0.78 0.75
national T-bill 2003.05 2005.05 SYM 0.56 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.88
SA T-bill 1992.11 2005.05 MTAR* 0.52 0.61 0.61 0.84 0.84 0.84
Namibia national discount 1995.11 2005.05 STD 0.26 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.38
SA discount 2000.01 2005.05 STD 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
national T-bill 1999.10 2005.05 MTAR* 0.04 0.31 0.46 0.42 0.63 0.58
SA T-bill 1999.12 2005.05 MTAR* 0.08 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.49
Average respose of deposit rate to national discount 0.42 0.61 0.64 0.57 0.57 0.60
SA discount 0.30 0.55 0.58 0.55 0.56 0.57
national T-bill 0.36 0.62 0.69 0.70 0.78 0.78
SA T-bill 0.45 0.64 0.65 0.68 0.68 0.69
Panel B: Prime Lending Rate
South Africa national discount 1991.01 2005.05 BTAR* 0.58 1.07 1.08 1.04 1.06 0.99
national T-bill 1997.06 2005.05 MTAR* 1.11 0.81 0.81 1.22 1.23 1.14
Lesotho national discount 2003.06 2005.05 SYM 0.46 1.34 1.34 0.98 0.98 1.01
SA discount 1999.01 2005.05 SYM 0.58 0.73 0.73 0.82 0.82 0.91
national T-bill 2003.06 2005.05 MTAR* 0.25 1.36 0.87 1.53 1.10 0.88
SA T-bill 1998.12 2005.05 STD 0.87 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71
Swaziland national discount 2003.09 2005.05 BTAR* 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
SA discount 1995.03 2005.05 MTAR* 0.50 0.67 0.62 0.84 0.78 0.84
national T-bill 2003.06 2005.05 MTAR* 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.94 0.94 0.87
SA T-bill 1995.03 2005.05 BTAR* 0.53 0.80 0.48 1.07 0.57 0.93
Namibia national discount 1991.01 2005.05 MTAR* 0.13 0.68 0.68 0.76 0.76 0.85
SA discount 1994.09 2005.05 TAR* -0.08 0.74 0.77 0.74 0.76 0.89
national T-bill 1994.10 2005.05 MTAR* 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.84 0.84 0.95
SA T-bill 1994.10 2003.05 MTAR* 0.27 0.49 0.49 0.80 0.80 0.98
Average respose of lendig rate to national discount 0.54 1.02 1.03 0.95 0.95 0.96
SA discount 0.39 0.80 0.80 0.86 0.85 0.91
national T-bill 0.66 0.87 0.75 1.13 1.03 0.96
SA T-bill 0.69 0.70 0.62 0.95 0.83 0.94
Note: The interim multipliers are reported for a 1% shock only.
sample period






















South Africa deposit -2.36 -5.75 1 1 12.79 31.41 1 1 -2.35 -5.74 1 1 14.33 29.37 0 1 -2.13 -6.50 1 1
Lesotho deposit -2.06 -8.44 1 1 9.03 47.91 1 1 -1.94 -8.44 1 1 5.55 51.10 1 1 -1.83 -9.52 1 1
Swaziland deposit -1.92 -6.38 1 1 7.70 29.85 1 1 -1.96 -6.39 1 1 8.23 29.12 1 1 -1.54 -7.22 1 1
Namibia deposit -1.99 -6.38 1 1 11.27 33.33 1 1 -2.21 -6.38 1 1 11.70 31.00 1 1 -1.63 -7.16 1 1
South Africa prime lending -2.34 -5.51 1 1 8.68 26.64 1 1 -2.33 -5.51 1 1 8.91 25.50 1 1 -1.96 -6.25 1 1
Lesotho prime lending -2.90 -10.00 1 1 6.55 69.29 1 1 -2.87 -10.00 1 1 5.76 70.34 1 1 -2.39 -11.26 1 1
Swaziland prime lending -1.90 -6.09 1 1 7.63 27.11 1 1 -2.09 -6.06 1 1 9.38 26.26 1 1 -1.22 -6.87 1 1
Namibia prime lending -2.33 -9.68 1 1 8.50 68.02 1 1 -2.32 -9.67 1 1 8.96 67.47 1 1 -2.00 -10.83 1 1
South Africa discount -2.38 -5.95 1 1 8.30 29.14 1 1 -2.36 -5.96 1 1 8.53 28.00 1 1 -1.87 -6.76 1 1
Lesotho discount -2.45 -8.63 1 1 6.69 51.65 1 1 -2.44 -8.62 1 1 5.85 52.15 1 1 -2.30 -9.70 1 1
Swaziland discount -2.01 -6.18 1 1 7.00 27.54 1 1 -2.01 -6.14 1 1 8.93 26.82 1 1 -1.20 -6.93 1 1
Namibia discount -2.10 -5.37 1 1 10.76 25.25 1 1 -2.12 -5.38 1 1 12.35 23.38 1 1 -1.83 -6.11 1 1
South Africa t-bill -2.63 -5.86 1 1 11.99 31.48 1 1 -2.62 -5.87 1 1 13.77 29.58 0 1 -2.51 -6.64 1 1
Lesotho t-bill -2.14 -8.56 1 1 6.90 52.25 1 1 -2.14 -8.55 1 1 7.42 51.67 1 1 -2.07 -9.57 1 1
Swaziland t-bill -1.83 -7.74 1 1 6.40 40.10 1 1 -1.75 -7.72 1 1 5.50 39.79 1 1 -1.72 -8.62 1 1
Namibia t-bill -2.28 -6.05 1 1 12.35 33.45 1 1 -2.28 -6.05 1 1 15.27 31.57 0 1 -2.22 -6.81 1 1
I(?)I(?)
mean shift trend shift recursive
I(?)I(?)I(?)
Table A2: Structural Breaks in the Long-Run Relationship
country bank rate supF Breakpoint
Panel A: Long-run relationship between national bank rate and national discount rate
South Africa deposit 54.05 May-97
Lesotho deposit 298.95 February-99
Swaziland deposit 450.47 September-94
Namibia deposit 61.56 October-95
South Africa prime lending 9.55 August-01 insignificant
Lesotho prime lending 44.54 May-03
Swaziland prime lending 124.48 August-03
Namibia prime lending 13.76 September-92 insignificant
Panel B: Long-run relationship between national bank rate and South African discount rate
South Africa deposit 54.05 May-97
Lesotho deposit 143.95 March-98
Swaziland deposit 17.70 September-92
Namibia deposit 69.04 December-99
South Africa prime lending 9.55 August-01 insignificant
Lesotho prime lending 70.45 December-98
Swaziland prime lending 144.14 February-95
Namibia prime lending 78.09 August-94
Panel C: Long-run relationship between national bank rate and national T-bill rate
South Africa deposit 46.12 August-98
Lesotho deposit 162.89 June-98
Swaziland deposit 89.27 April-03
Namibia deposit 34.48 September-99
South Africa prime lending 65.25 May-97
Lesotho prime lending 40.08 May-03
Swaziland prime lending 54.82 May-03
Namibia prime lending 60.42 September-94
Panel B: Long-run relationship between national bank rate and South AfricanT-bill rate
South Africa deposit 46.12 August-98
Lesotho deposit 152.47 May-98
Swaziland deposit 60.72 October-92
Namibia deposit 75.30 November-99
South Africa prime lending 65.25 May-97
Lesotho prime lending 69.42 November-98
Swaziland prime lending 190.14 February-95
Namibia prime lending 67.34 September-94
Critical values are based on Hansen (1992) and differ depending on the model, the number of
observations, etc.. In general, any estimated supF test statistic larger than approximately 15
will allow us to reject the null hypothesis of no structural break.
Table A3: The long-run relationship between bank rates and policy rates
country bank rate start end obs coeff t-stat coeff t-stat DW DF ADF coint?
Panel A: Relationship of national bank rate to national discount rate
South Africa deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 -1.53 -5.65 1.01 51.61 0.41 -4.53 -3.41 yes
South Africa deposit 1991.01 1997.05 77 -3.64 -6.06 1.18 29.32 0.45 -3.04 yes
South Africa deposit 1997.06 2005.05 96 -0.71 -3.02 0.91 50.74 0.83 -5.05 yes
South Africa prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 3.42 23.56 0.99 95.07 0.97 -7.41 -5.35 yes
Lesotho deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 0.07 0.04 0.53 4.62 0.06 -1.86 -1.55 no
Lesotho deposit 1991.01 1999.02 98 3.40 2.04 0.48 4.64 0.17 -2.11 -2.22 no
Lesotho deposit 1999.03 2005.05 75 1.02 1.94 0.26 7.70 0.75 -4.24 -2.10 yes
Lesotho prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 2.83 3.29 0.89 16.50 0.46 -4.85 -2.76 yes
Lesotho prime lending 1991.01 2003.05 149 6.19 7.33 0.70 13.56 0.65 -5.65 -4.15 yes
Lesotho prime lending 2003.06 2005.05 24 -0.90 -0.76 1.01 11.72 1.00 -2.73 -3.52 yes
Swaziland deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 -2.17 -8.50 0.86 43.59 0.04 -1.65 -1.69 no
Swaziland deposit 1991.01 1994.09 45 -10.58 -26.72 1.64 50.10 0.33 -4.04 -3.38 yes
Swaziland deposit 1994.10 2005.05 128 -2.47 -21.47 0.86 98.41 0.21 -2.56 -1.99 no
Swaziland prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 3.56 64.55 0.96 224.29 0.39 -5.12 -3.70 yes
Swaziland prime lending 1991.01 2003.08 152 3.05 59.76 1.00 262.02 0.84 -7.98 yes
Swaziland prime lending 2003.09 2005.05 21 3.50 16487030694366.30 1.00 37126738274667.90 0.01 -2.56 no
Namibia deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 1.40 5.49 0.59 34.43 0.19 -2.83 -2.31 no
Namibia deposit 1991.01 1995.10 58 -1.50 -3.42 0.72 27.99 1.52 -5.79 -5.30 yes
Namibia deposit 1995.11 2005.05 115 0.81 3.24 0.66 36.32 0.23 -2.54 -2.79 no
Namibia prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 5.05 16.44 0.85 41.41 0.68 -6.11 -4.17 yes
Panel B: Relationship of national bank rate to South African discount rate
South Africa deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 -1.53 -5.65 1.01 51.61 0.41 -4.53 -3.41 yes
South Africa deposit 1991.01 1997.05 77 -3.64 -6.06 1.18 29.32 0.45 -3.04 yes
South Africa deposit 1997.06 2005.05 96 -0.71 -3.02 0.91 50.74 0.83 -5.05 yes
South Africa prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 3.42 23.56 0.99 95.07 0.97 -7.41 -5.35 yes
Lesotho deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 -3.29 -4.82 0.87 17.68 0.14 -2.43 no
Lesotho deposit 1991.01 1998.03 87 -2.79 -2.00 0.93 10.05 0.22 -2.24 -2.47 no
Lesotho deposit 1998.04 2005.05 86 -0.76 -2.25 0.54 20.25 0.68 -4.36 -3.39 yes
Lesotho prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 8.02 18.69 0.66 21.31 0.63 -5.61 -2.29 yes
Lesotho prime lending 1991.01 1998.12 96 3.95 5.07 0.88 17.69 1.43 -7.20 -3.87 yes
Lesotho prime lending 1999.01 2005.05 77 5.96 15.99 0.91 27.91 0.53 -3.51 yes
Swaziland deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 -1.26 -5.26 0.73 42.66 0.29 -4.22 yes
Swaziland deposit 1991.01 1992.09 21 13.53 14.51 -0.17 -3.04 0.20 -2.08 -1.89 no
Swaziland deposit 1992.10 2005.05 152 -1.49 -6.19 0.75 42.37 0.32 -3.68 yes
Swaziland prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 5.53 15.28 0.75 28.73 0.13 -3.52 yes
Swaziland prime lending 1991.01 1995.02 50 9.41 23.59 0.40 14.49 0.44 -3.43 yes
Swaziland prime lending 1995.03 2005.05 123 4.79 18.20 0.84 43.46 0.31 -3.16 -4.23 yes
Namibia deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 0.37 1.31 0.70 34.20 0.26 -3.34 no
Namibia deposit 1991.01 1999.12 108 1.77 4.36 0.63 23.95 0.49 -3.77 yes
Namibia deposit 2000.01 2005.05 65 3.50 8.15 0.36 9.11 0.21 -1.96 -1.60 no
Namibia prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 4.15 8.90 0.97 29.02 0.44 -4.90 -3.57 yes
Namibia prime lending 1991.01 1994.08 44 3.48 3.78 1.13 18.00 0.95 -3.71 -4.44 yes
Namibia prime lending 1994.09 2005.05 129 4.69 12.52 0.89 32.50 0.78 -5.56 -3.73 yes
Panel C: Relationship of national bank rate to national T-bill rate
South Africa deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 -1.36 -7.59 1.09 77.43 0.98 -7.45 -4.70 yes
South Africa deposit 1991.01 1998.08 92 -0.27 -0.83 1.03 45.25 1.51 -7.18 yes
South Africa deposit 1998.09 2005.05 81 -0.79 -4.38 1.01 60.94 0.57 -3.92 -2.87 yes
South Africa prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 3.92 20.44 1.05 69.36 0.50 -5.12 -3.33 yes
South Africa prime lending 1991.01 1997.05 77 6.91 18.76 0.82 31.06 0.57 -3.52 -3.36 yes
South Africa prime lending 1997.06 2005.05 96 2.91 18.95 1.14 87.03 1.28 -6.70 yes
intercept slope sample period
Table A3: The long-run relationship between bank rates and policy rates
country bank rate start end obs coeff t-stat coeff t-stat DW DF ADF coint?
intercept slope sample period
Lesotho deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 -3.12 -3.96 0.97 15.05 0.22 -3.13 -1.97 no
Lesotho deposit 1991.01 1998.06 90 1.97 1.99 0.70 9.36 0.28 -2.58 no
Lesotho deposit 1998.07 2005.05 83 -1.52 -3.40 0.66 16.44 0.77 -4.33 -2.91 yes
Lesotho prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 8.01 15.98 0.74 18.19 0.50 -4.89 -1.89 yes
Lesotho prime lending 1991.01 2003.05 149 10.19 19.69 0.59 14.49 0.71 -5.62 -2.45 yes
Lesotho prime lending 2003.06 2005.05 24 4.98 10.66 0.88 17.48 0.65 -2.03 yes
Swaziland deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 -0.63 -1.88 0.89 28.65 0.38 -4.07 -3.06 yes
Swaziland deposit 1991.01 2003.04 148 0.79 2.84 0.78 31.25 0.60 -5.03 yes
Swaziland deposit 2003.05 2005.05 25 -2.25 -5.58 0.88 18.83 2.81 -10.69 yes
Swaziland prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 6.18 14.31 0.90 22.53 0.24 -3.31 -2.71 no
Swaziland prime lending 1991.01 2003.05 149 7.83 19.38 0.78 21.46 0.28 -3.55 -2.87 yes
Swaziland prime lending 2003.60 2005.05 24 4.44 9.66 0.87 16.14 1.99 -6.08 -4.13 yes
Namibia deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 0.37 1.70 0.76 45.41 0.37 -4.10 -4.64 yes
Namibia deposit 1991.01 1999.09 105 2.33 6.30 0.63 25.05 0.48 -3.69 -4.10 yes
Namibia deposit 1999.10 2005.05 68 1.83 4.25 0.58 13.14 0.31 -2.33 -2.44 no
Namibia prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 4.43 10.07 1.03 30.15 0.42 -4.77 -3.63 yes
Namibia prime lending 1991.01 1994.09 45 5.58 6.34 1.05 16.41 0.74 -3.32 -3.50 yes
Namibia prime lending 1994.10 2005.05 128 4.80 12.81 0.95 32.20 0.69 -5.14 -3.31 yes
Panel D: Relationship of national bank rate to South African T-bill rate
South Africa deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 -1.36 -7.59 1.09 77.43 0.98 -7.45 -4.70 yes
South Africa deposit 1991.01 1998.08 92 -0.27 -0.83 1.03 45.25 1.51 -7.18 yes
South Africa deposit 1998.09 2005.05 81 -0.79 -4.38 1.01 60.94 0.57 -3.92 -2.87 yes
South Africa prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 3.92 20.44 1.05 69.36 0.50 -5.12 -3.33 yes
South Africa prime lending 1991.01 1997.05 77 6.91 18.76 0.82 31.06 0.57 -3.52 -3.36 yes
South Africa prime lending 1997.06 2005.05 96 2.91 18.95 1.14 87.03 1.28 -6.70 yes
Lesotho deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 -3.46 -5.71 0.97 20.26 0.18 -2.82 no
Lesotho deposit 1991.01 1998.05 89 -1.11 -1.14 0.89 12.61 0.27 -2.58 -2.69 no
Lesotho deposit 1998.06 2005.05 84 -0.92 -2.78 0.61 20.79 0.81 -4.84 yes
Lesotho prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 8.36 19.57 0.69 20.59 0.52 -4.99 -1.86 yes
Lesotho prime lending 1991.01 1998.11 95 5.52 8.61 0.85 18.96 1.42 -7.12 -3.56 yes
Lesotho prime lending 1998.12 2005.05 78 5.53 11.21 1.04 22.04 0.24 -2.39 no
Swaziland deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 -0.83 -3.13 0.77 36.93 0.25 -4.17 -5.12 yes
Swaziland deposit 1991.01 1992.10 22 11.39 19.80 -0.05 -1.23 0.29 -1.68 0.41 no
Swaziland deposit 1992.11 2005.05 151 -1.55 -6.73 0.84 44.48 0.43 -4.29 -5.73 yes
Swaziland prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 6.13 15.31 0.77 24.45 0.12 -3.43 -3.46 yes
Swaziland prime lending 1991.01 1995.02 50 11.00 29.41 0.31 11.23 0.24 -2.36 -2.21 no
Swaziland prime lending 1995.03 2005.05 123 4.66 17.18 0.93 42.65 0.45 -3.93 -5.36 yes
Namibia deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 0.54 2.14 0.76 37.99 0.26 -3.44 -3.71 yes
Namibia deposit 1995.09 1999.11 107 2.83 8.57 0.61 26.49 0.48 -3.68 -4.18 yes
Namibia deposit 1999.12 2005.05 66 2.66 6.37 0.49 11.40 0.23 -2.15 -2.30 no
Namibia prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 4.57 9.96 1.03 28.62 0.40 -4.51 -3.18 yes
Namibia prime lending 1991.01 1994.09 45 7.28 10.87 0.95 19.09 0.89 -3.53 -3.65 yes
Namibia prime lending 1994.10 2005.05 128 4.61 11.41 0.98 30.27 0.67 -5.05 -3.28 yes
The following test statistics are reported: Durbin Watson (DW), Dickey Fuller (DF), Augmented Dickey Fuller with optimal lag length selected by AIC criteria based
on all models up to 4 lags (ADF(k4)) or 12 lags (ADF(k12)). The critical values at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for 100 observations are as follows: 0.511, 0.386, and
0.322 for DW, 4.07, 3.37, and 3.03 for DF, 3.77, 3.17, and 2.84 for ADF(k). Cointegration is considered to exist if at least 2 test statistics are significant at 10% level
or 1 test statistic at 5% level.
Table A4: TAR model selection
AIC optimal Asymmetric Cointegration symmetric Pass-through
country bankrate start end obs TAR0 TAR* BTAR* MTAR0 MTAR* min AIC TAR modelΗ0: Σj ρj=0 H0: ρ1=ρ2 H0: ρ1=ρ3 H0: ρ2=ρ3 coint? coint? model
Panel A: Relationship of national bank rate to national discount rat
South Africa deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 625.00 620.09 620.62 621.32 614.01 614.01 MTAR* 11.26 11.06 yes,asym yes MTAR*
South Africa deposit 1991.01 1997.05 77 185.99 185.20 181.87 186.12 182.75 181.87 BTAR* 4.85 5.25 0.62 6.26 no yes SYM
South Africa deposit 1997.06 2005.05 96 318.56 316.66 315.72 314.84 308.30 308.30 MTAR* 16.25 10.66 yes,asym yes MTAR*
South Africa prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 532.94 531.98 518.33 533.56 530.19 518.33 BTAR* 11.01 16.67 0.78 16.94 yes,asym yes BTAR*
Lesotho deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 797.71 796.46 795.71 797.80 790.11 790.11 MTAR* 4.84 7.74 no no STD
Lesotho deposit 1991.01 1999.02 98 382.89 381.76 370.72 382.88 382.39 370.72 BTAR* 5.96 13.97 0.00 14.14 no no STD
Lesotho deposit 1999.03 2005.05 75 240.65 235.72 235.56 240.85 232.14 232.14 MTAR* 21.39 14.52 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Lesotho prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 846.55 841.26 843.08 849.81 825.23 825.23 MTAR* 16.22 26.92 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Lesotho prime lending 1991.01 2003.05 149 706.64 701.46 702.28 706.25 679.31 679.31 MTAR* 20.73 31.38 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Lesotho prime lending 2003.06 2005.05 24 43.55 42.96 42.80 43.61 31.70 31.70 MTAR* 18.91 13.50 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Swaziland deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 203.89 191.49 180.50 189.83 178.73 178.73 MTAR* 16.41 26.56 yes,asym no MTAR*
Swaziland deposit 1991.01 1994.09 45 -44.44 -50.12 -48.19 -80.75 -80.75 -80.75 MTAR0 44.67 68.65 yes,asym yes MTAR0
Swaziland deposit 1994.10 2005.05 128 115.54 107.21 114.59 114.11 102.42 102.42 MTAR* 8.99 14.04 yes,asym no MTAR*
Swaziland prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 49.77 48.17 45.17 48.00 38.22 38.22 MTAR* 13.31 12.06 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Swaziland prime lending 1991.01 2003.08 152 -3.88 -4.87 -5.47 -6.03 -6.32 -6.32 MTAR* 21.86 6.03 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Swaziland prime lending 2003.09 2005.05 21 -50.69 -55.94 -70.64 -55.02 -59.81 -70.64 BTAR* 42.27 28.08 18.15 32.54 yes,asym no BTAR*
Namibia deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 523.73 518.76 509.71 518.70 514.47 509.71 BTAR* 7.04 12.39 0.76 16.09 yes,asym no BTAR*
Namibia deposit 1991.01 1995.10 58 106.95 105.83 105.80 106.76 106.10 105.80 BTAR* 2.91 2.82 0.01 2.82 no yes SYM
Namibia deposit 1995.11 2005.05 115 317.58 315.27 311.90 315.67 314.32 311.90 BTAR* 5.10 7.75 0.14 7.69 no no STD
Namibia prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 761.56 759.96 755.45 761.17 756.92 755.45 BTAR* 8.13 8.00 0.04 7.95 yes,asym yes BTAR*
Panel B: Relationship of national bank rate to South African discount rat
South Africa deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 625.00 620.09 620.62 621.32 614.01 614.01 MTAR* 11.26 11.06 yes,asym yes MTAR*
South Africa deposit 1991.01 1997.05 77 185.99 185.20 181.87 186.12 182.75 181.87 BTAR* 4.85 5.25 0.62 6.26 no yes SYM
South Africa deposit 1997.06 2005.05 96 318.56 316.66 315.72 314.84 308.30 308.30 MTAR* 16.25 10.66 yes,asym yes MTAR*
South Africa prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 532.94 531.98 518.33 533.56 530.19 518.33 BTAR* 11.01 16.67 0.78 16.94 yes,asym yes BTAR*
Lesotho deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 776.22 775.44 770.22 775.63 772.47 770.22 BTAR* 4.45 7.90 0.11 7.86 no no STD
Lesotho deposit 1991.01 1998.03 87 311.16 306.28 300.36 310.52 308.06 300.36 BTAR* 6.12 8.06 2.00 13.19 no no STD
Lesotho deposit 1998.04 2005.05 86 326.03 324.34 322.58 323.12 315.12 315.12 MTAR* 16.49 11.36 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Lesotho prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 824.28 821.25 814.03 823.30 805.18 805.18 MTAR* 12.33 19.61 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Lesotho prime lending 1991.01 1998.12 96 430.79 429.96 426.97 431.40 425.09 425.09 MTAR* 7.42 6.12 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Lesotho prime lending 1999.01 2005.05 77 229.04 227.61 227.08 229.25 227.86 227.08 BTAR* 4.27 3.51 0.23 4.11 no yes SYM
Swaziland deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 533.23 532.86 531.74 514.16 514.16 514.16 MTAR0 19.89 19.94 yes,asym yes MTAR0
Swaziland deposit 1991.01 1992.09 21 -39.73 -42.14 -42.17 -40.18 -43.05 -43.05 MTAR* 4.04 2.62 no no STD
Swaziland deposit 1992.10 2005.05 152 477.06 476.38 476.16 468.53 468.53 468.53 MTAR0 14.66 12.74 yes,asym yes MTAR0
Swaziland prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 545.65 544.16 534.06 537.06 532.97 532.97 MTAR* 11.71 13.04 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Swaziland prime lending 1991.01 1995.02 50 49.52 44.22 43.37 44.25 38.02 38.02 MTAR* 13.01 12.86 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Swaziland prime lending 1995.03 2005.05 123 365.43 364.52 363.27 362.88 361.57 361.57 MTAR* 11.22 3.85 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Namibia deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 582.20 580.69 575.16 582.10 570.54 570.54 MTAR* 9.33 11.81 yes,asym no MTAR*
Namibia deposit 1991.01 1999.12 108 302.92 301.72 297.11 303.19 301.09 297.11 BTAR* 5.65 7.29 0.33 7.65 no yes SYM
Namibia deposit 2000.01 2005.05 65 129.96 126.94 127.63 129.01 123.50 123.50 MTAR* 5.14 7.02 no no STD
Namibia prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 807.57 805.97 802.77 806.24 802.64 802.64 MTAR* 9.09 5.47 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Namibia prime lending 1991.01 1994.08 44 116.79 116.31 113.17 112.56 112.56 112.56 MTAR0 6.04 4.20 yes,asym yes MTAR0
Namibia prime lending 1994.09 2005.05 129 578.28 576.04 576.20 577.93 577.59 576.04 TAR* 8.86 3.46 yes,asym yes TAR*
Table A4: TAR model selection
AIC optimal Asymmetric Cointegration symmetric Pass-through
country bankrate start end obs TAR0 TAR* BTAR* MTAR0 MTAR* min AIC TAR modelΗ0: Σj ρj=0 H0: ρ1=ρ2 H0: ρ1=ρ3 H0: ρ2=ρ3 coint? coint? model
Panel C: Relationship of national bank rate to national T-bill rat
South Africa deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 610.87 607.94 609.27 610.94 602.12 602.12 MTAR* 10.80 8.80 yes,asym yes MTAR*
South Africa deposit 1991.01 1998.08 92 264.99 260.14 259.41 265.24 253.60 253.60 MTAR* 13.39 13.38 yes,asym yes MTAR*
South Africa deposit 1998.09 2005.05 81 180.54 172.72 174.00 180.77 169.68 169.68 MTAR* 14.98 13.82 yes,asym yes MTAR*
South Africa prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 536.40 535.29 529.65 535.11 522.21 522.21 MTAR* 12.09 14.42 yes,asym yes MTAR*
South Africa prime lending 1991.01 1997.05 77 161.83 161.50 161.33 161.98 158.54 158.54 MTAR* 3.51 3.26 no yes SYM
South Africa prime lending 1997.06 2005.05 96 251.72 250.50 246.89 248.96 246.32 246.32 MTAR* 17.86 5.54 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Lesotho deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 873.25 872.35 869.18 872.98 870.64 869.18 BTAR* 3.26 5.78 0.40 5.90 no no STD
Lesotho deposit 1991.01 1998.06 90 355.67 352.75 352.01 356.22 355.22 352.01 BTAR* 3.47 0.10 4.94 5.05 no no STD
Lesotho deposit 1998.07 2005.05 83 324.00 323.66 324.23 323.89 313.21 313.21 MTAR* 10.54 11.32 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Lesotho prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 828.11 824.37 823.78 826.88 812.98 812.98 MTAR* 9.46 15.94 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Lesotho prime lending 1991.01 2003.05 149 700.64 697.92 697.64 700.11 684.28 684.28 MTAR* 11.12 16.74 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Lesotho prime lending 2003.06 2005.05 24 22.30 21.76 21.45 21.87 16.39 16.39 MTAR* 6.35 6.14 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Swaziland deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 695.05 693.18 693.89 695.43 689.13 689.13 MTAR* 6.93 6.21 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Swaziland deposit 1991.01 2003.04 148 548.22 546.56 544.57 547.83 546.23 544.57 BTAR* 7.05 5.64 0.21 5.42 yes,asym yes BTAR*
Swaziland deposit 2003.05 2005.05 25 14.37 12.52 3.92 11.20 9.58 3.92 BTAR* 20.10 9.18 0.11 13.75 yes,asym yes BTAR*
Swaziland prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 702.72 700.38 698.26 703.43 698.52 698.26 BTAR* 4.12 6.31 0.88 6.31 no no STD
Swaziland prime lending 1991.01 2003.05 149 555.05 553.95 553.62 553.84 552.27 552.27 MTAR* 5.23 2.80 no yes SYM
Swaziland prime lending 2003.06 2005.05 24 29.40 29.14 30.63 29.19 16.97 16.97 MTAR* 26.50 15.23 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Namibia deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 544.10 543.01 542.28 543.87 539.68 539.68 MTAR* 10.97 4.37 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Namibia deposit 1991.01 1999.09 105 266.93 265.70 265.90 264.48 259.89 259.89 MTAR* 9.54 6.88 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Namibia deposit 1999.10 2005.05 68 131.15 129.90 128.82 126.23 121.28 121.28 MTAR* 7.40 10.56 yes,asym no MTAR*
Namibia prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 789.00 788.14 784.31 788.00 787.34 784.31 BTAR* 6.10 6.45 0.05 6.55 yes,asym yes BTAR*
Namibia prime lending 1991.01 1994.09 45 127.75 125.77 125.61 127.76 123.42 123.42 MTAR* 5.43 3.99 no yes SYM
Namibia prime lending 1994.10 2005.05 128 562.25 561.66 561.50 561.84 557.57 557.57 MTAR* 8.06 4.69 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Panel D: Relationship of national bank rate to South African T-bill rat
South Africa deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 610.87 607.94 609.27 610.94 602.12 602.12 MTAR* 10.80 8.80 yes,asym yes MTAR*
South Africa deposit 1991.01 1998.08 92 264.99 260.14 259.41 265.24 253.60 253.60 MTAR* 13.39 13.38 yes,asym yes MTAR*
South Africa deposit 1998.09 2005.05 81 180.54 172.72 174.00 180.77 169.68 169.68 MTAR* 14.98 13.82 yes,asym yes MTAR*
South Africa prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 536.40 535.29 529.65 535.11 522.21 522.21 MTAR* 12.09 14.42 yes,asym yes MTAR*
South Africa prime lending 1991.01 1997.05 77 161.83 161.50 161.33 161.98 158.54 158.54 MTAR* 3.51 3.26 no yes SYM
South Africa prime lending 1997.06 2005.05 96 251.72 250.50 246.89 248.96 246.32 246.32 MTAR* 17.86 5.54 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Lesotho deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 793.21 792.38 792.75 789.13 787.55 787.55 MTAR* 5.37 5.57 no no STD
Lesotho deposit 1991.01 1998.05 89 311.78 307.59 303.08 312.09 307.95 303.08 BTAR* 5.80 9.98 2.21 11.06 no no STD
Lesotho deposit 1998.06 2005.05 84 313.32 312.13 309.83 313.29 300.55 300.55 MTAR* 19.37 13.53 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Lesotho prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 798.86 797.62 799.40 799.37 778.92 778.92 MTAR* 12.13 21.24 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Lesotho prime lending 1991.01 1998.11 95 411.21 407.23 406.91 412.88 407.13 406.91 BTAR* 5.09 7.42 0.15 2.17 no yes SYM
Lesotho prime lending 1998.12 2005.05 78 220.51 216.84 213.40 220.49 217.78 213.40 BTAR* 4.31 8.39 0.42 9.19 no no STD
Swaziland deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 551.52 550.53 551.31 545.29 538.68 538.68 MTAR* 18.12 13.05 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Swaziland deposit 1991.01 1992.10 22 -37.46 -37.46 -71.12 -18.43 -67.98 -71.12 BTAR* 87.99 239.21 3.52 71.47 yes,asym no BTAR*
Swaziland deposit 1992.11 2005.05 151 489.92 489.40 489.08 489.50 485.49 485.49 MTAR* 17.54 4.47 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Swaziland prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 576.24 575.76 575.33 571.79 567.65 567.65 MTAR* 10.09 8.52 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Swaziland prime lending 1991.01 1995.02 50 44.37 42.04 41.47 23.71 20.54 20.54 MTAR* 18.04 27.28 yes,asym no MTAR*
Swaziland prime lending 1995.03 2005.05 123 407.49 406.16 394.84 407.64 401.58 394.84 BTAR* 15.83 14.95 0.50 14.92 yes,asym yes BTAR*
Namibia deposit 1991.01 2005.05 173 556.22 553.88 555.23 554.12 535.70 535.70 MTAR* 16.62 21.08 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Namibia deposit 1995.09 1999.11 107 272.16 269.90 269.90 267.48 259.24 259.24 MTAR* 13.49 13.20 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Namibia deposit 1999.12 2005.05 66 129.28 126.44 122.42 127.97 119.68 119.68 MTAR* 8.70 10.28 yes,asym no MTAR*
Namibia prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 173 797.20 796.67 793.42 796.30 790.78 790.78 MTAR* 8.02 6.34 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Namibia prime lending 1991.01 1994.09 45 122.45 119.66 120.46 123.00 121.83 119.66 TAR* 5.05 3.10 no yes SYM
Namibia prime lending 1994.10 2005.05 128 574.12 571.62 570.88 573.93 569.67 569.67 MTAR* 8.15 4.62 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Table A5: Multipliers Based on Optimal Pass-Through Model
impact
country bankrate start end model threshold multiplier long-run 1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth 1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth 1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth 1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth
South Africa deposit 1991.01 2005.05 MTAR* -0.45 0.61 1.01 0.96 1.23 1.03 1.01 0.96 1.23 1.03 1.01 0.96 1.23 1.03 1.01 0.96 1.23 1.03 1.01
South Africa deposit 1991.01 1997.05 SYM 0.72 1.18 0.82 0.93 1.03 1.13 0.82 0.93 1.03 1.13 0.82 0.93 1.03 1.13 0.82 0.93 1.03 1.13
South Africa deposit 1997.06 2005.05 MTAR* -0.32 0.50 0.91 0.91 1.11 0.84 0.90 0.91 1.22 0.85 0.91 0.91 1.23 0.85 0.91 0.91 1.23 0.85 0.91
South Africa prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 BTAR* 0.04 0.58 0.99 1.01 1.07 1.04 1.04 1.01 1.08 1.06 1.06 1.01 1.03 0.97 0.98 1.01 1.03 0.97 0.98
Lesotho deposit 1991.01 2005.05 STD 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Lesotho deposit 1991.01 1999.02 STD 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Lesotho deposit 1999.03 2005.05 MTAR* -0.90 0.06 0.26 0.02 0.08 0.18 0.25 0.02 0.08 0.18 0.25 0.02 0.08 0.18 0.25 0.02 0.08 0.18 0.25
Lesotho prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 MTAR* 1.77 0.61 0.89 0.46 0.57 0.67 0.73 0.46 0.57 0.67 0.73 0.46 0.57 0.67 0.73 0.46 0.57 0.67 0.73
Lesotho prime lending 1991.01 2003.05 MTAR* 1.40 0.66 0.70 0.47 0.61 0.71 0.70 0.47 0.61 0.71 0.70 0.47 0.61 0.71 0.70 0.47 0.61 0.71 0.7
Lesotho prime lending 2003.06 2005.05 BTAR* 0.38 -0.12 1.01 -0.15 0.03 0.42 0.94 -0.15 1.31 2.38 1.74 -0.15 0.03 0.42 0.92 -0.15 1.31 2.01 1.54
Lesotho prime lending 2003.06 2005.05 SYM 0.46 1.01 0.94 1.34 0.98 1.04 0.94 1.34 0.98 1.04 0.94 1.34 0.98 1.04 0.94 1.34 0.98 1.04
Swaziland deposit 1991.01 2005.05 MTAR* -0.69 0.89 0.86 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.9 0.89
Swaziland deposit 1991.01 1994.09 MTAR0 1.43 1.64 1.38 1.30 1.13 0.45 1.38 1.53 1.52 1.58 1.38 1.30 1.13 0.45 1.38 1.53 1.52 1.58
Swaziland deposit 1994.10 2005.05 MTAR* -0.49 0.87 0.86 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.87
Swaziland prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 MTAR* 0.04 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.95 0.95
Swaziland prime lending 1991.01 2003.08 MTAR* -0.02 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Swaziland prime lending 2003.09 2005.05 BTAR* 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Namibia deposit 1991.01 2005.05 BTAR* 0.81 0.14 0.59 0.46 0.65 0.64 0.70 0.46 0.75 0.61 0.49 0.46 0.81 0.71 0.83 0.46 0.93 0.58 0.34
Namibia deposit 1991.01 1995.10 SYM 0.09 0.72 0.57 0.76 0.72 0.72 0.57 0.76 0.72 0.72 0.57 0.76 0.72 0.72 0.57 0.76 0.72 0.72
Namibia deposit 1995.11 2005.05 STD 0.26 0.38 0.34 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.34 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.34 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.34 0.37 0.38 0.38
Namibia prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 MTAR* -0.88 0.13 0.85 0.71 0.68 0.76 0.84 0.71 0.68 0.76 0.84 0.71 0.68 0.76 0.84 0.71 0.68 0.76 0.84
Panel B: Relationship of national bank rate to South African discount rate
South Africa deposit 1991.01 2005.05 MTAR* -0.45 0.61 1.01 0.96 1.23 1.03 1.01 0.96 1.23 1.03 1.01 0.96 1.23 1.03 1.01 0.96 1.23 1.03 1.01
South Africa deposit 1991.01 1997.05 SYM 0.72 1.18 0.82 0.93 1.03 1.13 0.82 0.93 1.03 1.13 0.82 0.93 1.03 1.13 0.82 0.93 1.03 1.13
South Africa deposit 1997.06 2005.05 MTAR* -0.32 0.50 0.91 0.91 1.11 0.84 0.90 0.91 1.22 0.85 0.91 0.91 1.23 0.85 0.91 0.91 1.23 0.85 0.91
South Africa prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 BTAR* 0.04 0.58 0.99 1.01 1.07 1.04 1.04 1.01 1.08 1.06 1.06 1.01 1.03 0.97 0.98 1.01 1.03 0.97 0.98
Lesotho deposit 1991.01 2005.05 STD 0.38 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32
Lesotho deposit 1991.01 1998.03 STD 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42
Lesotho deposit 1998.04 2005.05 MTAR* 0.75 0.26 0.54 0.39 0.37 0.53 0.53 0.39 0.37 0.53 0.53 0.39 0.37 0.53 0.53 0.39 0.37 0.53 0.53
Lesotho prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 MTAR* 1.00 0.17 0.66 0.80 1.00 0.61 0.67 0.80 1.00 0.61 0.67 0.80 1.00 0.61 0.67 0.80 1.00 0.61 0.67
Lesotho prime lending 1991.01 1998.12 MTAR* 1.00 0.16 0.88 0.85 1.30 0.58 0.83 0.85 1.30 0.58 0.83 0.85 1.30 0.58 0.83 0.85 1.30 0.58 0.83
Lesotho prime lending 1999.01 2005.05 SYM 0.58 0.91 0.64 0.73 0.82 0.88 0.64 0.73 0.82 0.88 0.64 0.73 0.82 0.88 0.64 0.73 0.82 0.88
Swaziland deposit 1991.01 2005.05 MTAR0 0.89 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.89
Swaziland deposit 1991.01 1992.09 STD -0.08 -0.16 -0.12 -0.15 -0.16 -0.16 -0.12 -0.15 -0.16 -0.16 -0.12 -0.15 -0.16 -0.16 -0.12 -0.15 -0.16 -0.16
Swaziland deposit 1992.10 2005.05 MTAR0 0.37 0.75 0.56 0.66 0.77 0.78 0.56 0.65 0.78 0.78 0.56 0.66 0.77 0.78 0.56 0.65 0.78 0.78
Swaziland prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 MTAR* -0.36 0.38 0.75 0.57 0.68 0.77 0.78 0.57 0.62 0.70 0.73 0.57 0.62 0.70 0.73 0.57 0.62 0.70 0.73
Swaziland prime lending 1991.01 1995.02 MTAR* -0.33 0.14 0.40 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.40
Swaziland prime lending 1995.03 2005.05 MTAR* -0.28 0.50 0.84 0.59 0.67 0.84 0.88 0.59 0.62 0.78 0.86 0.59 0.62 0.78 0.86 0.59 0.62 0.78 0.86
Namibia deposit 1991.01 2005.05 MTAR* -1.48 0.03 0.70 0.37 0.56 0.62 0.63 0.37 0.56 0.62 0.63 0.37 0.56 0.62 0.63 0.37 0.56 0.62 0.63
Namibia deposit 1991.01 1999.12 SYM 0.18 0.63 0.35 0.54 0.62 0.63 0.35 0.54 0.62 0.63 0.35 0.54 0.62 0.63 0.35 0.54 0.62 0.63
Namibia deposit 2000.01 2005.05 STD 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Namibia prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 MTAR* -1.55 -0.14 0.97 0.66 0.65 0.73 0.82 0.66 0.65 0.73 0.82 0.66 0.65 0.73 0.82 0.66 0.65 0.73 0.82
Namibia prime lending 1991.01 1994.08 MTAR0 -0.06 1.13 1.31 0.82 1.15 1.14 1.31 1.00 1.28 1.15 1.31 0.82 1.15 1.14 1.31 1.00 1.28 1.15
Namibia prime lending 1994.09 2005.05 TAR* 0.57 -0.08 0.89 0.64 0.74 0.74 0.80 0.64 0.77 0.76 0.82 0.64 0.74 0.74 0.80 0.64 0.74 0.74 0.80
Panel C: Relationship of national bank rate to national T-bill rate
South Africa deposit 1991.01 2005.05 MTAR* 0.63 0.93 1.09 0.83 0.76 1.12 1.07 0.83 0.76 1.12 1.07 0.83 0.76 1.12 1.07 0.83 0.76 1.12 1.07
South Africa deposit 1991.01 1998.08 MTAR* -0.54 0.97 1.03 0.83 0.78 1.07 1.03 0.83 0.78 1.07 1.03 0.83 0.78 1.07 1.03 0.83 0.78 1.07 1.03
South Africa deposit 1998.09 2005.05 MTAR* -0.31 0.71 1.01 0.74 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.74 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.74 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.74 0.98 1.00 0.99
South Africa prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 MTAR* 0.71 0.89 1.05 0.84 0.86 1.00 1.01 0.84 0.86 1.00 1.01 0.84 0.86 1.00 1.01 0.84 0.86 1.00 1.01
South Africa prime lending 1991.01 1997.05 SYM 0.50 0.82 0.59 0.71 0.78 0.82 0.59 0.71 0.78 0.82 0.59 0.71 0.78 0.82 0.59 0.71 0.78 0.82
South Africa prime lending 1997.06 2005.05 MTAR* 0.43 1.11 1.14 0.87 0.81 1.22 1.19 0.87 0.81 1.23 1.19 0.87 0.81 1.23 1.19 0.87 0.81 1.23 1.19
Lesotho deposit 1991.01 2005.05 STD 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Lesotho deposit 1991.01 1998.06 STD -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
Lesotho deposit 1998.07 2005.05 MTAR* 0.33 0.13 0.66 0.14 0.31 0.49 0.56 0.14 0.45 0.61 0.63 0.14 0.31 0.49 0.56 0.14 0.31 0.49 0.56
Lesotho prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 MTAR* 1.40 0.58 0.74 0.55 0.63 0.60 0.65 0.55 0.63 0.60 0.65 0.55 0.63 0.60 0.65 0.55 0.63 0.60 0.65
Lesotho prime lending 1991.01 2003.05 MTAR* 1.40 0.56 0.59 0.48 0.54 0.52 0.56 0.48 0.54 0.52 0.56 0.48 0.54 0.52 0.56 0.48 0.54 0.52 0.56
Lesotho prime lending 2003.06 2005.05 MTAR* -0.36 0.25 0.88 0.47 1.36 1.53 0.77 0.47 0.87 1.10 0.88 0.47 0.87 1.10 0.88 0.47 0.87 1.10 0.88
Swaziland deposit 1991.01 2005.05 MTAR* -1.45 0.15 0.89 0.34 0.48 0.42 0.46 0.34 0.48 0.42 0.46 0.34 0.48 0.42 0.46 0.34 0.48 0.42 0.46
Swaziland deposit 1991.01 2003.04 BTAR* 0.12 0.15 0.78 0.31 0.67 0.82 0.90 0.31 0.35 0.41 0.44 0.31 0.35 0.41 0.44 0.31 0.35 0.41 0.44
Swaziland deposit 2003.05 2005.05 MTAR* 0.19 0.55 0.88 0.94 0.69 0.64 0.68 0.94 0.98 0.99 0.95 0.94 0.54 0.60 0.63 0.94 0.92 0.72 0.75
Swaziland deposit 2003.05 2005.05 SYM 0.56 0.88 0.95 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.95 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.95 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.95 0.87 0.88 0.88
Swaziland prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 STD 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Swaziland prime lending 1991.01 2003.05 SYM 0.15 0.78 0.20 0.27 0.35 0.48 0.20 0.27 0.35 0.48 0.20 0.27 0.35 0.48 0.20 0.27 0.35 0.48
sample period multiplier for a -0.5% monetary policy shockmultiplier for a +1% monetary policy shock multiplier for a -1% monetary policy shock multiplier for a +0.5% monetary policy shock
Table A5: Multipliers Based on Optimal Pass-Through Model
impact
country bankrate start end model threshold multiplier long-run 1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth 1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth 1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth 1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth
sample period multiplier for a -0.5% monetary policy shockmultiplier for a +1% monetary policy shock multiplier for a -1% monetary policy shock multiplier for a +0.5% monetary policy shock
Swaziland prime lending 2003.06 2005.05 MTAR* -0.18 0.86 0.87 0.80 0.86 0.94 0.91 0.80 0.86 0.94 0.91 0.80 0.86 0.94 0.91 0.80 0.86 0.94 0.91
Namibia deposit 1991.01 2005.05 MTAR* -0.43 0.24 0.76 0.52 0.51 0.64 0.72 0.52 0.51 0.65 0.72 0.52 0.51 0.65 0.72 0.52 0.51 0.65 0.72
Namibia deposit 1991.01 1999.09 MTAR* -0.04 0.29 0.63 0.51 0.42 0.58 0.62 0.51 0.42 0.59 0.62 0.51 0.42 0.58 0.62 0.51 0.42 0.59 0.62
Namibia deposit 1999.10 2005.05 MTAR* 0.22 0.04 0.58 0.23 0.31 0.42 0.54 0.23 0.46 0.63 0.67 0.23 0.31 0.42 0.54 0.23 0.46 0.63 0.67
Namibia prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 BTAR* 0.25 0.34 1.03 0.56 0.97 1.01 1.03 0.56 0.97 1.01 1.03 0.56 0.97 1.01 1.03 0.56 0.97 1.01 1.03
Namibia prime lending 1991.01 1994.09 SYM 0.35 1.05 0.48 0.72 0.90 1.02 0.48 0.72 0.90 1.02 0.48 0.72 0.90 1.02 0.48 0.72 0.90 1.02
Namibia prime lending 1994.10 2005.05 MTAR* 1.07 0.43 0.95 0.67 0.44 0.84 0.89 0.67 0.44 0.84 0.89 0.67 0.44 0.84 0.89 0.67 0.44 0.84 0.89
Panel D: Relationship of national bank rate to South African T-bill rate
South Africa deposit 1991.01 2005.05 MTAR* 0.63 0.93 1.09 0.83 0.76 1.12 1.07 0.83 0.76 1.12 1.07 0.83 0.76 1.12 1.07 0.83 0.76 1.12 1.07
South Africa deposit 1991.01 1998.08 MTAR* -0.54 0.97 1.03 0.83 0.78 1.07 1.03 0.83 0.78 1.07 1.03 0.83 0.78 1.07 1.03 0.83 0.78 1.07 1.03
South Africa deposit 1998.09 2005.05 MTAR* -0.31 0.71 1.01 0.74 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.74 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.74 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.74 0.98 1.00 0.99
South Africa prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 MTAR* 0.71 0.89 1.05 0.84 0.86 1.00 1.01 0.84 0.86 1.00 1.01 0.84 0.86 1.00 1.01 0.84 0.86 1.00 1.01
South Africa prime lending 1991.01 1997.05 SYM 0.50 0.82 0.59 0.71 0.78 0.82 0.59 0.71 0.78 0.82 0.59 0.71 0.78 0.82 0.59 0.71 0.78 0.82
South Africa prime lending 1997.06 2005.05 MTAR* 0.43 1.11 1.14 0.87 0.81 1.22 1.19 0.87 0.81 1.23 1.19 0.87 0.81 1.23 1.19 0.87 0.81 1.23 1.19
Lesotho deposit 1991.01 2005.05 STD 0.38 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.31
Lesotho deposit 1991.01 1998.05 STD 0.71 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.65
Lesotho deposit 1998.06 2005.05 MTAR* -0.63 0.56 0.61 0.21 0.45 0.56 0.60 0.21 0.45 0.56 0.60 0.21 0.45 0.56 0.60 0.21 0.45 0.56 0.60
Lesotho prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 MTAR* 1.37 0.80 0.69 0.73 0.64 0.82 0.75 0.73 0.64 0.82 0.75 0.73 0.64 0.82 0.75 0.73 0.64 0.82 0.75
Lesotho prime lending 1991.01 1998.11 SYM 0.75 0.85 0.70 0.82 0.85 0.85 0.70 0.82 0.85 0.85 0.70 0.82 0.85 0.85 0.70 0.82 0.85 0.85
Lesotho prime lending 1998.12 2005.05 STD 0.87 0.71 0.67 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.67 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.67 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.67 0.71 0.71 0.71
Swaziland deposit 1991.01 2005.05 MTAR* -1.45 0.15 0.89 0.34 0.48 0.42 0.46 0.34 0.48 0.42 0.46 0.34 0.48 0.42 0.46 0.34 0.48 0.42 0.46
Swaziland deposit 1991.01 1992.10 BTAR* 0.03 -0.38 -0.05 -0.32 0.01 0.18 0.20 -0.32 0.01 0.18 0.20 -0.32 0.01 0.18 0.20 -0.32 0.01 0.18 0.20
Swaziland deposit 1992.11 2005.05 MTAR* -0.48 0.52 0.84 0.42 0.61 0.84 0.87 0.42 0.61 0.84 0.87 0.42 0.61 0.84 0.87 0.42 0.61 0.84 0.87
Swaziland prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 MTAR* 1.31 0.46 0.77 0.34 0.55 0.72 0.80 0.34 0.55 0.72 0.80 0.34 0.55 0.72 0.80 0.34 0.55 0.72 0.80
Swaziland prime lending 1991.01 1995.02 MTAR* -0.01 0.26 0.31 0.05 0.03 0.20 0.33 0.05 0.12 0.17 0.33 0.05 0.03 0.20 0.34 0.05 0.12 0.17 0.33
Swaziland prime lending 1995.03 2005.05 BTAR* 0.02 0.53 0.93 0.40 0.80 1.07 1.15 0.40 0.48 0.57 0.59 0.40 0.77 1.09 1.21 0.40 0.48 0.57 0.59
Namibia deposit 1991.01 2005.05 MTAR* -0.71 0.22 0.76 0.52 0.49 0.62 0.70 0.52 0.49 0.62 0.70 0.52 0.49 0.62 0.70 0.52 0.49 0.62 0.70
Namibia deposit 1991.01 1999.11 MTAR* -0.65 0.24 0.61 0.53 0.48 0.59 0.63 0.53 0.48 0.59 0.63 0.53 0.48 0.59 0.63 0.53 0.48 0.59 0.63
Namibia deposit 1999.12 2005.05 MTAR* -0.62 0.08 0.49 0.23 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.23 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.23 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.23 0.57 0.56 0.56
Namibia prime lending 1991.01 2005.05 MTAR* 1.75 0.20 1.03 0.69 0.46 0.74 0.84 0.69 0.46 0.74 0.84 0.69 0.46 0.74 0.84 0.69 0.46 0.74 0.84
Namibia prime lending 1991.01 1994.09 SYM 0.44 0.95 0.55 0.76 0.88 0.94 0.55 0.76 0.88 0.94 0.55 0.76 0.88 0.94 0.55 0.76 0.88 0.94
Namibia prime lending 1994.10 2005.05 MTAR* 1.11 0.27 0.98 0.70 0.49 0.80 0.88 0.70 0.49 0.80 0.88 0.70 0.49 0.80 0.88 0.70 0.49 0.80 0.88
Figure 1: Interest rates in CMA countries
Panel A: Deposit rates Panel B: Prime lending rates
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Figure 2: Rolling Chow tests regarding structural breaks in the long-run relationship
Panel A: Relationship between national bank rate and national discount rat
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Figure 2 conti.: Rolling Chow tests regarding structural breaks in the long-run relationshi
Panel C: Relationship between national bank rate and national T-bill rat
Panel D: Relationship between national bank rate and South African T-bill rat
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